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T
he Eurasian magpie (Pica pica) has a poor reputation. 
As a child, I learned never to leave small shiny objects, 
such as teaspoons, unattended outdoors as these 
raucous birds will steal anything they can put their beaks on. 
This folklore even inspired a Rossini opera, “La gazza ladra” 
(“The Thieving Magpie”). Nowadays, this view has been 
replaced with one that is more sensitive to ecological balance, 
in which magpies are depicted as murderous plunderers of 
the nests of innocent songbirds. Either way, they are black-
and-white gangsters. 
But no one has ever accused a magpie of being stupid. 
The bird belongs to the Corvidae, a worldwide family (also 
including crows, ravens, jackdaws, jays, and nutcrackers) 
marked by an exceptionally large forebrain, which permits 
innovative foraging [1]. In recent years, this family has begun 
to pose a challenge to the idea that primates constitute the 
pinnacle of cognitive evolution by showing creative tool-use, 
visual perspective-taking, foresight, and so on [2].
The one cognitive accomplishment still missing, and 
therefore sometimes glossed over by corvid fans, is 
recognition of oneself in a mirror, a capacity found in only 
a handful of large-brained mammals. A great deal has been 
made of this capacity, including turning it into a touchstone 
for the legal concept of “personhood” [3].
The typical mirror mark test, developed four decades ago 
by Gordon Gallup [4], seeks to determine whether an animal 
recognizes itself in the mirror by marking a visible colored 
dot on the animal’s body. The mark needs to be placed 
on an out-of-view body part so that it can be detected only 
with guidance of a mirror. The mark test determines if the 
animal can use its reflection to locate the mark on its body, 
as measured by its inspection, touching, or rubbing of the 
spot. Obviously, an animal that considers its mirror image as 
another individual should perceive the mark as the other’s 
problem, not its own. Very few species pass the mark test of 
mirror self-recognition (MSR), despite hundreds that have 
been tested. Apart from humans, strong indications for MSR 
have been obtained only for the four great apes, bottlenose 
dolphins, and Asian elephants [5–7]. 
MSR is sometimes seen as a Rubicon, setting animals with 
a sense of self apart from those lacking such a sense. This 
dividing line has been questioned in several ways. Behaviorists, 
for example, have tried to reduce MSR to conditioning, 
claiming that the relationship between self and mirror can 
be learned. They successfully trained pigeons to peck at dots 
on themselves in front of a mirror [8], but another team that 
tried to replicate this feat never managed to do so, resulting in 
a paper with the word “Pinocchio” in its title [9].
These pigeon experiments are irrelevant to Gallup’s mark 
test, however, since the critical issue is whether animals 
spontaneously connect their reflection with their own body. 
Training the target behavior drains the mark test of its 
meaning. No untrained pigeon has ever managed to use a 
mirror to find dots on its own body.
Other critics of the Rubicon have been more subtle by 
either making the point that, obviously, all animals must have 
a sense of self, because otherwise how could they possibly 
navigate their environment, or by questioning the mark test 
as the best or sole criterion [10–12]. But for better or worse, 
this test has remained the gold standard of self-identity.
The new magpie study published in this issue of PLoS 
Biology by Helmut Prior and co-workers [13] of the Ruhr-
University in Bochum, Germany, is as well-controlled as any 
mirror study on other self-recognizing species, and in fact 
better controlled than most ape and human child studies, 
which generally fail to include “sham” marks. A sham mark 
is applied in the same way as a visible mark, and supposed to 
feel and smell the same, but cannot be visibly detected. In 
the magpie study [13], this was done by placing a black mark 
onto the magpies’ black throat feathers. 
Placed on the same black throat feathers, the visible 
mark—a tiny colored sticker—stood out, but only in a mirror. 
Put in front of a mirror, the magpies kept scratching with 
their foot until the mark was gone, whereas they left the 
sham mark alone. They also didn’t do the same amount of 
frantic scratching if there was no mirror to see themselves in. 
Evidently, their self-preening was guided by visual feedback 
from the mirror. 
From an evolutionary perspective, it must be added that 
MSR seems hardly interesting. It cannot be an important 
adaptation, since animals lacking this capacity have no 
trouble with reflective surfaces, such as standing pools of 
water. Animals certainly do not need to recognize themselves 
to survive. The importance of the mirror test rather resides in 
what it may tell us about how animals perceive themselves in 
relation to their environment, including their social partners. 
In other words, the mirror test is interesting not because it 
shows that an animal has the capacity for self-recognition but 
because of the cognitive abilities that are associated with MSR.
It has been speculated that MSR coincides with advanced 
social relationships, including the capacity to look at 
the world from another’s viewpoint. Gallup [14] already 
speculated about this connection, and more recently this 
idea has been connected to the various levels of empathy 
reached by mammals. The higher levels of empathy require 
individuals to grasp the situation in which another finds itself, 
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hence looking at the situation from another’s perspective. 
The same capacity may be reflected in MSR. This is known 
as the “co-emergence hypothesis,” according to which the 
capacities for MSR and perspective-taking appear in tandem 
during both evolution and development [15].
With regards to human development, this hypothesis is 
well-supported. Children begin to show perspective-taking 
abilities at around the same time that they first pass the 
mirror mark test, even after age has been controlled for 
[16,17]. In the future, researchers may be able to address 
this issue more directly through neural investigation. In 
humans, for example, the right inferior parietal cortex, at 
the temporo-parietal junction, underpins advanced empathy 
by helping distinguish between self- and other-produced 
actions [18]. If mirror responses tap into the same self–other 
distinction, the mark test is obviously more than it appears.
Where do magpies fit into this larger scheme? Perhaps 
perspective taking is critically important for a species that 
plunders the nests of others and steals from humans. 
But more likely, this capacity may serve relations among 
conspecifics. Magpies occasionally cache food and may raid 
each others’ caches, the way their close relatives, the jays, do. 
For scrub jays, there is evidence that “it takes a thief to know 
a thief,” suggesting that these birds extrapolate from their 
own pilfering experiences to the intentions of others [19]. 
Even if their perspective-taking is not used to assist others, 
but rather to outwit them, the same grasp of another’s 
situation may be needed as in advanced empathy, perhaps 
requiring the same parsing of self from other. 
Although there remain many unknowns in the study of self 
awareness, establishing a connection with social cognition 
seems a promising angle, which may well extend to the 
magpie. As the ultimate bird thief, this species may have 
more need than most to guess the intentions of others.
Whatever our conclusions, at the very least the self-
recognition of La gazza ladra offers fresh meaning to its love 
of reflective items.
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